The incredible Volcker disinflation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goodfriend, M; King, RG
• 署名单位: Boston University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.07.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 981-1015
• 关键词: credibility; disinflation; monetary policy; Volcker

摘要

The reduction in inflation that occurred in the early 1980s, when the Federal Reserve was headed by Paul Volcker, is arguably the most widely discussed and visible macroeconomic event of the last 50 years of U.S. history. Inflation had been dramatically rising, but under Volcker, the Fed first contained and then reversed this process. Using a simple modern macroeconomic model, we argue that the real effects of the Volcker disinflation were mainly due to its imperfect credibility. In our view, the observed upward volatility and subsequent stubborn elevation of long-term interest rates during the disinflation are key indicators of that imperfect credibility. Studying transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee recently released to the public, we find-to our surprise-that Volcker and other FOMC members likewise regarded the long-term interest rates as indicative of inflation expectations and of the credibility of their disinflationary policy. Drawing from the transcripts and other contemporary sources, we consider the interplay of monetary targets, operating procedures, and credibility during the Volcker disinflation. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.