Strategic amnesty and credible immigration reform

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chau, NH
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/322075
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 604-634
• 关键词: illegal immigration; Consistency; migration; TARIFFS; POLICY

摘要

Why do countries that impose employer sanctions to deter the illegal entry of foreign workers nevertheless grant amnesty to illegal immigrants? In this article, I provide a positive theory of amnesty provision in a model where the constrained optimal immigration reform, involving the joint use of employer sanctions and border interdictions, is time-inconsistent. In particular, my framework demonstrates that host countries of immigration can enhance the credibility of their immigration reforms by binding their own hands and strategically granting a socially excessive amount of amnesty to illegal workers.