Bargaining and information: An empirical analysis of a multistage arbitration game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pecorino, P; Van Boening, M
• 署名单位: University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Mississippi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/322825
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 922-948
• 关键词: final-offer arbitration; other-regarding behavior; Social distance; Dictator games; settlement; TRIAL

摘要

We conduct an experimental analysis of final offer arbitration (FOA) with differentially informed players. Under FOA, the arbitrator must choose one of the two submitted offers. In our control, the uninformed player makes an offer to the informed player prior to the submission of offers to the arbitrator. The treatment allows negotiation after offers are submitted to the arbitrator. Because these offers are potentially binding, they may transmit privately held information and, thereby, lower the dispute rate, We find that allowing negotiation in the face of potentially binding offers lowers the dispute rate by 27 percentage points.