One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Fatum, R
• 署名单位: University of Alberta
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.03.010
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 659-669
• 关键词: Monetary union; decision making; Strategic delegation

摘要

This paper employs a multi-country delegation monetary policy model and argues that a decision-making mechanism based on the median voter theorem where intensity of preferences cannot play a role does not capture important aspects of policy setting in the European Monetary Union. Replacing the median voter mechanism with a less restrictive weighted mean mechanism, it is shown that strategic delegation can lead to a surprising degree of central bank inflation aversion. This finding supports the The Twin Sister Hypothesis and the perception of the European Central Bank implementing the policy of the Bundesbank rather than a more inflationary monetary policy. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.