Regulation versus taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alesina, Alberto; Passarelli, Francesco
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Teramo; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.09.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 147-156
• 关键词: externalities; voting; rules; taxation

摘要

We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the activity, and a proportional tax on it. For all instruments the majority chooses levels which are too restrictive when the activity is performed mainly by a small fraction of the population, and when costs for reducing activities or paying taxes are sufficiently convex. Also a majority may prefer an instrument different than what a social planner would choose; for instance a rule when the social planner would choose a tax. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.