Organizational form and the market for talent

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harstad, Bard
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/512745
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 581-611
• 关键词: Career concerns; incentives; turnover; firm; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS; management; PERSPECTIVE; performance; superstars

摘要

This article brings together the market for products, the market for talent, and firms' organizational form. While the organizational design determines the allocation of blame and fame within the firm, the value of a good reputation depends on the market structure. Consequently, the market structure dictates the optimal organizational design. If competition becomes tougher and the market thicker, transparent firms decentralize while nontransparent firms concentrate control, transparency itself is improved, corporations switch from unitary to multidivisional form, and the turnover of managers increases. The model rationalizes recent trends in both executive pay and organizational design.