Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cockx, Bart; Ghirelli, Corinna; Van der Linden, Bruno
• 署名单位: Ghent University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.03.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 80-95
• 关键词: job search model; Job search monitoring; Non-compliance; measurement error; hyperbolic discounting; Social efficiency

摘要

DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) and Paserman (2008) have shown that imposing job search requirements on sophisticated unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic time preferences is Pareto improving in that it raises welfare for the unemployed, by limiting harmful procrastination, and for employees, since the enhanced search boosts the job finding rate, thereby reducing the contributions required for the funding of benefits. This paper demonstrates that the range of Pareto improvements is much reduced if the analysis takes into account the fact that benefit claimants may not comply with the requirements, especially if the monitoring technology displays imperfections induced by caseworker discretion or measurement error. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.