Anti-social behavior in profit and nonprofit organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Auriol, Emmanuelle; Brilon, Stefanie
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Goethe University Frankfurt
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.05.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 149-161
• 关键词: intrinsic motivation; Incentive contract; nonprofit; sabotage; Candidate selection; Catholic Church; ABUSE

摘要

Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: good workers care about the mission of an organization, whereas bad workers derive pleasure from destructive behavior. Compared to the case with only good motivated workers, the mission-oriented sector has to resort to higher monitoring to deter bad workers from entering the sector. In equilibrium, bad workers work in the for-profit sector where they behave like normal people, while good workers self-select into the mission-oriented sector. In the profit-oriented sector, both monitoring and bonus payments for good behavior increase to control the damage caused by bad workers. The results of the paper are illustrated by examples from child care and the threat posed by pedophiles in this sector. (C) 2014 Elsevier BM. All rights reserved.