Student and worker mobility under university and government competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Delpierre, Matthieu; Verheyden, Bertrand
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.11.012
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 26-41
• 关键词: Student mobility; worker mobility; University competition; Government competition

摘要

We provide a normative analysis of endogenous student and worker mobility in the presence of diverging interests between universities and governments. Student mobility generates a university competition effect which induces them to overinvest in education, whereas worker mobility generates a free-rider effect for governments, who are not willing to subsidize the education of agents who will work abroad. At equilibrium, the free-rider effect always dominates the competition effect, resulting in underinvestment in human capital. This inefficiency can be corrected under exogenous university budgets if a transnational transfer for mobile students is implemented. With endogenous income taxation, under the non-cooperative equilibrium between governments, the combination of the free-rider effect and fiscal competition leads to underinvestment in both teaching and research. Furthermore, the transnational transfer no longer restores efficiency. Instead, it can reinforce fiscal competition and imposes a tradeoff between research and human capital. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.