Is There Monopsony in the Labor Market? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Staiger, Douglas O.; Spetz, Joanne; Phibbs, Ciaran S.
• 署名单位: Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California San Francisco; US Department of Veterans Affairs; Veterans Health Administration (VHA); VA Palo Alto Health Care System; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/652734
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 211-236
• 关键词: wages; POWER; COMPETITION; FIRMS

摘要

Recent theoretical and empirical advances have renewed interest in monopsonistic models of the labor market. However, there is little direct empirical support for these models. We use an exogenous change in wages at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals as a natural experiment to investigate the extent of monopsony in the nurse labor market. We estimate that labor supply to individual hospitals is quite inelastic, with short-run elasticity around 0.1. We also find that non-VA hospitals responded to the VA wage change by changing their own wages.