Recruitment Restrictions and Labor Markets: Evidence from the Postbellum US South

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Naidu, Suresh
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/651512
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 413-445
• 关键词: discrimination; sharecroppers; CONTRACTS; ECONOMICS; earnings; cotton

摘要

This article studies the effect of recruitment restrictions on mobility and wages in the postbellum U.S. South. I estimate the effects of criminal fines charged for enticement (recruiting workers already under contract) on sharecropper mobility, tenancy choice, and agricultural wages. I find that a $13 (10%) increase in the enticement fine lowered the probability of a move by black sharecroppers by 12%, daily wages by 1 cent (.1%), and the returns to experience for blacks by 0.6% per year. These results are consistent with an on-the-job search model, where the enticement fine raises the cost of recruiting an employed worker.