Is a Higher Calling Enough? Incentive Compensation in the Church

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hartzell, Jay C.; Parsons, Christopher A.; Yermack, David L.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/652461
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 509-539
• 关键词: sensitivity; OWNERSHIP; pay

摘要

We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3% of the incremental revenue from membership increases. Ministers receive the strongest rewards for attracting new parishioners who switch from other congregations within their denomination. Monetary incentives are weaker in settings where ministers have less control over their measured performance.