Displacement, Asymmetric Information, and Heterogeneous Human Capital

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hu, Luojia; Taber, Christopher
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/656373
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 113-152
• 关键词: Adverse selection; labor-markets; layoffs; DISCRIMINATION; LITIGATION; lemons; size

摘要

Gibbons and Katz's asymmetric information model of the labor market predicts that wage losses following displacement should be larger for layoffs than for plant closings. This was borne out in their empirical work. In this article, we examine how the difference in wage losses across plant closing and layoff varies with race and gender. We find that the basic prediction by Gibbons and Katz holds only for white males. We augment their asymmetric information model with heterogeneous human capital and show that this augmented model can match the data.