Labor Market Signaling and Self-Confidence: Wage Compression and the Gender Pay Gap

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Santos-Pinto, Luis
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/666646
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 873-913
• 关键词: own incompetence; promotion dynamics; overconfidence; FIRMS; difficulties; INFORMATION; assessments; performance; incentives; INVESTMENT

摘要

I extend Spence's signaling model by assuming that some workers are overconfident-they underestimate their marginal cost of acquiring education-and some are underconfident. Firms cannot observe workers' productive abilities and beliefs but know the fractions of high-ability, overconfident, and underconfident workers. I find that biased beliefs lower the wage spread and compress the wages of unbiased workers. I show that gender differences in self-confidence can contribute to the gender pay gap. If education raises productivity, men are overconfident, and women underconfident, then women will, on average, earn less than men. Finally, I show that biased beliefs can improve welfare.