The Effect of Employment Protection on Teacher Effort

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jacob, Brian A.
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/669942
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 727-761
• 关键词: job security; ACCOUNTABILITY; performance; PRODUCTIVITY; absenteeism; incentives; IMPACT; pay

摘要

In 2004, the Chicago Public Schools and the Chicago Teachers Union signed a new collective bargaining agreement that gave principals the flexibility to dismiss probationary teachers (those with fewer than 5 years of experience) for any reason and without the hearing process typical in many urban districts. Results suggest that the policy reduced annual teacher absences by roughly 10% and reduced the incidence of frequent absences by 25%. The majority of the effect was due to changes in the composition of teachers in the district, although there is evidence of modest incentive effects for young untenured teachers.