Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DeVaro, Jed; Morita, Hodaka
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/667814
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 227-269
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; strategic promotion; wage dynamics; performance; FIRMS; tournaments; MARKET; DISCRIMINATION; COMPENSATION; PRODUCTIVITY

摘要

We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of internal promotion versus external recruitment, using a job-assignment model involving competing firms with heterogeneous productivities and two-level job hierarchies with one managerial position. The model predicts that, controlling for the number of managers, increasing the number of lower-level workers is associated with (1) greater internal promotion as opposed to external recruitment, (2) higher profit, and (3) more general training. Empirical analysis of a large cross section of British employers is consistent with these predictions.