Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri; Verbeke, Willem
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/667996
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 305-326
• 关键词: relational demography; performance; COMPETITION; sex; COMPENSATION; preferences; contests; awards; work; gap

摘要

We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a sufficiently large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament.