Worker replacement
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Menzio, Guido; Moen, Espen R.
署名单位：
University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; BI Norwegian Business School
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.05.015
发表日期：
2010
页码：
623-636
关键词：
摘要：
Consider a labor market in which firms want to insure existing employees against income fluctuations and, simultaneously, want to recruit new employees to fill vacant jobs. Firms can commit to a wage policy, i.e. a policy that specifies the wage paid to their employees as a function of tenure, productivity and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to employ workers. In this environment, the optimal wage policy prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior workers, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires. The downward rigidity in the hiring wage magnifies the response of unemployment to negative shocks. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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