Tax buyouts
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Del Negro, Marco; Perri, Fabrizio; Schivardi, Fabiano
署名单位：
University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Cagliari
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.06.005
发表日期：
2010
页码：
576-595
关键词：
摘要：
The paper studies a fiscal policy instrument that can reduce fiscal distortions without affecting revenues, in a politically viable way. The instrument is a private contract (tax buyout), offered by the government to each citizen, whereby the citizen can choose to pay a fixed price in exchange for a given reduction in her tax rate for a period of time. We introduce the tax buyout in a dynamic overlapping generations economy, calibrated to match several features of the US income, taxes and wealth distribution. Under simple pricing, the introduction of the buyout is revenue neutral but, by reducing distortions, benefits a significant fraction of the population and leads to sizable increases in aggregate labor supply, income and consumption. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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