The signaling role of policy actions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Baeriswyl, Romain; Cornand, Camille
署名单位：
Swiss National Bank (SNB); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.06.001
发表日期：
2010
页码：
682-695
关键词：
摘要：
In an economy affected by shocks that are imperfectly known, the monetary instrument takes on a dual stabilizing role: as a policy response that directly influences the economy and as a vehicle for information that reveals the central bank's assessment to firms. Because mark-up shocks cannot be neutralized by monetary policy, providing firms with more information about these shocks exacerbates their reaction and creates a larger distortion. Recognizing the signaling role of its instrument, the central bank distorts its policy response in order to optimally shape firms' beliefs. While providing firms with more information is always detrimental to the output gap, it has a more subtle effect on price dispersion depending on whether information is provided through the transparency channel or through the signaling channel. Although more transparency is always detrimental to welfare, the information that is conveyed by the monetary instrument improves welfare when firms' coordination is highly valuable. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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