The Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guertler, Marc; Guertler, Oliver
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/681207
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1007-1042
• 关键词: rank-order tournaments; promotion tournaments; empirical-analysis; selection; sabotage; PRODUCTIVITY; CONTRACTS; PARTICIPATION; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION

摘要

We investigate the effect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to exert effort in a market-based tournament. External employers use promotion decisions to estimate employees' abilities and adjust their wage offers accordingly. Employees exert effort to increase the probability of being promoted and thus to increase their ability assessment and wage offer. We demonstrate that ability assessments and wage offers are more sensitive to promotion decisions in the case of heterogeneous employees. Thus, employees have a higher incentive to affect the tournament outcome, and employers find it optimal to hire heterogeneous employees.