Uncertainty and the Politics of Employment Protection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vindigni, Andrea; Scotti, Simone; Tealdi, Cristina
• 署名单位: IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; Collegio Carlo Alberto; Universite Paris Cite
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/678306
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 209-267
• 关键词: labor-market flexibility; severance payments; firing costs; job security; unemployment; turnover; wage; equilibrium; ECONOMY; CONSEQUENCES

摘要

This paper investigates social preferences over employment protection regulation in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand and sheds some light on the comparative dynamics of Eurosclerosis. When firing costs are low, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all the employed workers with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold; when their status quo level is high, preserving a rigid labor market is favored only by the employed with intermediate productivity. A more volatile environment and a lower rate of productivity growth increase the political support for labor market rigidity only in high-rents economies.