Do Agents Game Their Agents' Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benson, Alan
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/681107
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 863-890
• 关键词: stock option awards; incentives; schemes

摘要

This paper examines how sales managers, acting as agents of the firm, game the staffing and incentives of their subordinates. Sales managers on a quota's cusp have a unique personal incentive to retain and lower quotas for poor-performing subordinates, allowing one to isolate a manager's interest from the firm's. Using microdata from 244 firms that subscribe to a cloud-based service for processing sales compensation, I estimate that 13%-15% of both quota adjustments and retentions among poor performers are explained by managers' incentives around quotas. Although a minority of poor performers are subsequently terminated or transferred, most are retained indefinitely.