Imperfect information, multiple shocks, and policy's signaling role
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Berkelmans, Leon
署名单位：
Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2011.07.002
发表日期：
2011
页码：
373-386
关键词：
摘要：
In multiple shock models, when agents have imperfect information they attempt to infer a shock's type, in addition to its size. In this environment, monetary policy plays an important signaling role. This paper highlights this signaling role by showing that conclusions from imperfect information monetary models are sensitive to the number of shocks included. With multiple shocks, contractionary monetary policy can initially increase inflation and delay the eventual disinflation. Moreover, multiple shocks can result in destabilizing price flexibility, while optimal policy's response to one shock will depend on the existence of other shocks, contrary to a typical linear-quadratic framework. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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