Bureaucratic Responses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prendergast, Canice
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/683780
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: S183-S215
• 关键词: organizations; incentives

摘要

This paper's interest is in understanding how bureaucracies should respond to their clients. I claim that because many services are not priced, the responses of bureaucracies to their clients will often be the opposite of the reactions of normal firms. Specifically, bureaucracies ignore the most credible complaints from clients, provide the poorest service to clients who value the service most, and require the most red tape for clients who already know their needs.