Fraud deterrence in dynamic Mirrleesian economies
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Armenter, Roc; Mertens, Thomas M.
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; New York University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.11.001
发表日期：
2013
页码：
139-151
关键词：
摘要：
Insurance schemes rely on legal consequences to deter fraud and tax evasion. This observation guides us to introduce random state verification in a dynamic economy with private information. With some probability, an agent's skill becomes known to the planner who prescribes punishments to misreporting agents. Deferring consumption can ease the provision of incentives creating a motive for subsidizing savings. In an infinite horizon economy, the constrained-efficient allocation converges to high consumption, full insurance, and no labor distortions for any positive probability of state verification. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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