Ability Tracking, School and Parental Effort, and Student Achievement: A Structural Model and Estimation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fu, Chao; Mehta, Nirav
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/697559
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 923-979
• 关键词: secondary-schools; resource-allocation; peer achievement; ACCOUNTABILITY; COMPETITION; vouchers; PRIVATE; IMPACT; identification; incentives

摘要

We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of ability tracking in which schools decide how to allocate students into ability tracks and choose track-specific teacher effort; parents choose effort in response. The model is estimated using Early Childhood Longitudinal Study data. Our model suggests that a counterfactual ban on tracking would benefit low-ability students but hurt high-ability students. Ignoring effort adjustments would significantly overstate the impacts. We then illustrate the trade-offs involved when considering policies that affect schools' tracking decisions. Setting proficiency standards to maximize average achievement would lead schools to redistribute their inputs from low- to high-ability students.