Turf wars

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herrera, Helios; Reuben, Ernesto; Ting, Michael M.
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 143-153
• 关键词: Turf war; ORGANIZATIONS; bureaucracy; JURISDICTION; COMPETITION; Information withholding

摘要

Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.