Voluntary disclosure of evaded taxes Increasing revenue, or increasing incentives to evade?

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Langenmayr, Dominika
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 110-125
• 关键词: tax evasion; voluntary disclosure; self-reporting

摘要

Many countries apply lower fines to tax evading individuals when they voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed. I model such voluntary disclosure mechanisms theoretically and show that while such mechanisms increase the incentive to evade taxes, they nevertheless increase tax revenues net of administrative costs. I confirm the importance of administrative costs in a survey of German competent local tax authorities. I then test the effects of voluntary disclosure on the tax evasion decision, using the introduction of the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program in the U.S. for identification. The analysis confirms that the introduction of voluntary disclosure increases tax evasion. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.