Public order and private payments: Evidence from the Swedish soccer league

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nyberg, Sten; Priks, Mikael
• 署名单位: Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.07.005
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-8
• 关键词: natural experiment; Co-payments for police; free-riding; Externality; Hooliganism

摘要

Should organizers of events share the associated costs of maintaining public order? We address this question by using unique data from the Swedish soccer league where co-payment for police were introduced for some clubs only. The difference-in-differences analysis shows that co-payments increased private guards by 40% and suggests a reduction of unruly behavior by 20%. The results are consistent with our model, where co payments alleviate under-provision in efforts by organizers to combat problems such as hooliganism due to externalities and free-riding on police services. The model also sheds light on the critique that co-payments could lead financially constrained organizers to provide less security. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.