Optimal tax administration

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Keen, Michael; Slemrod, Joel
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.04.006
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 133-142
• 关键词: tax administration; tax compliance; optimal taxation

摘要

This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions the enforcement elasticity of tax revenue that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Among the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap. (C) 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V.