Are bureaucrats paid like CEOs? Performance compensation and turnover of top civil servants

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Geys, Benny; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Sorensen, Rune J.
• 署名单位: BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.05.006
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 47-54
• 关键词: Bureaucracy; performance pay; public administration; Executive compensation; norway

摘要

Recent research explores the effect of financial and career incentives on public-sector hiring processes and subsequent performance. The reverse relation between performance and bureaucrats' compensation and turnover has received only limited attention. Due to the distinct features of public-sector organizations, bureaucrats are traditionally argued to require either permanent positions and fixed wages, or low-powered performance incentives. This article studies how the performance of top civil servants in Norwegian local governments affects their compensation and turnover. We thereby build on a unique new dataset over the period 1991-2014. Our results indicate that better performing top civil servants obtain a higher compensation and are less likely to be replaced. Nonetheless, these incentives remain low-powered in line with agency theory prescriptions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.