Labor Market Quotas When Promotions Are Signals
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bijkerk, Suzanne H.; Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Kamphorst, Jurjen; Swank, Otto H.
署名单位：
Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; University of Amsterdam
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0734-306X
DOI：
10.1086/710358
发表日期：
2021
页码：
437-460
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor market quotas create uncertainty about the reason a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted female employees because of the quota or their ability; their competitors do not. A winner's curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante, women are better off without quotas. Next we investigate how quotas affect incentives for employers to learn women's abilities to make better job assignment decisions. Then, under specific conditions women may benefit.
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