Less Competition, More Meritocracy?

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Fang, Dawei; Noe, Thomas
• 署名单位: University of Gothenburg; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/716920
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: top management turnover; tournaments

摘要

Uncompetitive contests for grades, promotions, retention, and job assignments, which feature lax standards and limited candidate pools, are often criticized for being unmeritocratic. We show that when contestants are strategic, lax standards and exclusivity can make selection more meritocratic. When many contestants compete for a few promotions, strategic contestants adopt high-risk strategies. Risk-taking reduces the correlation between performance and ability. Through reducing the effects of risk-taking, Peter principle promotion policies, which entail promoting some contestants that are unlikely to be worthy, can increase the overall correlation between selection and ability and thus further meritocracy.