The Value of Student Debt Relief and the Role of Administrative Barriers: Evidence from the Teacher Loan Forgiveness Program
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Jacob, Brian A.; Jones, Damon; Keys, Benjamin J.
署名单位:
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Chicago; University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0734-306X
DOI:
10.1086/728468
发表日期:
2024
页码:
S261-S292
关键词:
take-up
career
manipulation
incentives
CHOICE
IMPACT
STATES
摘要:
We explore how much borrowers value student debt relief in the setting of the federal Teacher Loan Forgiveness program, which cancels between $5,000 and $17,500 in debt for teachers at high-need schools. Using both quasi-experimental evidence and a randomized controlled trial, we find that neither eligibility nor a targeted information intervention affects employment decisions. Information was found to increase application and receipt rates for teachers who had achieved eligibility. Evidence from contingent valuation surveys suggests that teachers do in general value debt relief. Incorporating qualitative evidence, we conclude that take-up may be constrained by program complexity and administrative barriers.
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