Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bol, Damien; Matakos, Konstantinos; Troumpounis, Orestis; Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of London; King's College London; University of Padua; Lancaster University; University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: Electoral systems; proportional representation; Disproportionality; Strategic entry; polarization; laboratory experiment

摘要

How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.