Does being chosen to lead induce non-selfish behavior? Experimental evidence on reciprocity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Drazen, Allan; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.03.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 13-21
• 关键词: Leaders; RECIPROCITY; Citizen-candidate

摘要

We present experimental evidence that policies chosen by leaders depend on whether they were elected or appointed, and that this difference stems from how they are chosen per se, rather than on other explanations given in empirical studies. We find that elected leaders are significantly more likely to choose a non-selfish policy than leaders who are appointed. Elected leaders who act non-selfishly will favor the voter over the losing candidate, while appointed leaders show no tendency to favor the voter over the losing candidate. Our results provide support for the view that non-selfish behavior of leaders reflects a reciprocity motive; candidates do not simply implement their own preferences once in office, as suggested by the basic citizen-candidate model. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.