Confidence banking and strategic default

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ordonez, Guillermo
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.07.010
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 101-113
• 关键词: Reputation; securitization; Strategic default; confidence

摘要

Securitization relies on confidence. As securities are tied to a particular asset (or pool of assets), and investors lose when the asset defaults, the security issuer usually provides further coverage by promising to use the proceedings from other, non-securitized, assets. Although these promises are difficult to enforce, the issuer may still have incentives to strategically avoid default in order to build a reputation of holding high-quality assets. Confidence makes securitization more dependent on the issuer's reputation than other forms of financing and more volatile to forces behind reputation concerns, such as expectations about future profits. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.