Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben
• 署名单位: Duke University; Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104053
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: Public good contribution experiments; PUNISHMENT; voting

摘要

In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally compare the institution of democratic punishment, where members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, with individual peer-to-peer and dictatorial punishment institutions. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions. A comparison with dictatorial punishment suggests that the effect relative to traditional peer-to-peer punishment primarily works by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member's contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.