Occupational hazards and social disability insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Michaud, Amanda; Wiczer, David
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.04.002
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 77-92
• 关键词: Disability insurance; occupational choice; optimal policy

摘要

Using retrospective data, we introduce evidence that occupational exposure significantly affects disability risk. Incorporating this into a general equilibrium model, social disability insurance (SDI) affects welfare through (i) the classic, risk-sharing channel and (ii) a new channel of occupational reallocation. Both channels can increase welfare, but at the optimal SDI they are at odds. Welfare gains from additional risk-sharing are reduced by overly incentivizing workers to choose risky occupations. In a calibration, optimal SDI increases welfare by 6.3% relative to actuarially fair insurance, mostly due to risk sharing. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.