The king can do no wrong: On the criminal immunity of leaders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Jiahua; Chung, Kim-Sau; Qiao, Xue
• 署名单位: China Europe International Business School; Hong Kong Baptist University; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.11.008
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 15-26
• 关键词: Leader immunity; Hostage motive; CORRUPTION; autocracy; Party elites

摘要

In its recent anti-corruption campaign, China removed the criminal immunity originally enjoyed by its leaders. Absent fundamental changes in the political institution in which incumbent leaders, instead of citizens at large, select the next leaders such a partial reform pays off only if (i) it takes place at the right time, (ii) it goes easy on corrupt low-rank officials, and (iii) the government is reasonably centralized. Failing any of these, such a partial reform would lead to rampant corruption throughout the government hierarchy an outcome far worse than retaining leader immunity. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.