Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herrera, Helios; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; McMurray, Joseph C.
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Brigham Young University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104051
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: turnout; information aggregation; proportional representation; Majority rule; laboratory experiment

摘要

This paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyzes voter participation in common interest proportional representation (PR) elections, comparing this with majority rule. Consistent with theoretical predictions, poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting, thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed. A dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under PR, so abstention is higher in PR in contrast with private interest environments, and welfare is lower. Deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which allows for voter mistakes. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V.