Discussion of designing central bank digital currency by Agur, Ari and Dell'Ariccia

• 成果类型: Editorial Material
• 署名作者: Wilkins, Carolyn A.
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.09.009
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 80-84
• 关键词: CBDC; FinTech; Digital currency; financial intermediation; network effects

摘要

Central bank interest in issuing a fiat digital currency has opened the door to profound social-economic and policy issues. This paper presents a discussion of Agur et al. (2021), in which the authors study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CDBC). The main result of the work is that an interest-bearing CBDC (in particular, negative remuneration) alleviates the tradeoff between bank intermediation and the social value of maintaining cash. To be fully convincing from a policymaker's point of view, the results should be tested along several dimensions, including considering a wider range of trade offs with regards to the introduction of a CBDC. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.