Centralized School choice with unequal outside options q

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akbarpour, Mohammad; Kapor, Adam; Neilson, Christopher; van Dijk, Winnie; Zimmerman, Seth
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Princeton University; Harvard University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104644
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Matching; school choice; strategy-proof; Outside options

摘要

We study how market design choices exacerbate or mitigate pre-existing inequalities among participants. We introduce outside options in a well-known school choice model, and show that students always prefer manipulable over strategy-proof mechanisms if and only if they have an outside option. We test for the proposed relationship between outside options and manipulability in a setting where we can identify students' outside options and observe applications under two mechanisms. Consistent with theory, students with an outside option are more likely to list popular, highly-rated schools under the Boston mechanism, and this gap disappears after switching to a Deferred Acceptance mechanism. (c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).