How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heap, Shaun P. Hargreaves; Manifold, Emma; Matakos, Konstantinos; Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of London; King's College London; University of Warwick; University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104747
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: identity; INEQUALITY; redistribution; Minority Representation; Representative democracy; Voting Experiment

摘要

We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own -group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity. For candidates, identity might affect the optimal campaign platform. There is evidence to support all four. Our key contribution comes from bringing the candidate supply of redistribution policies into an equilib-rium analysis with voter demand for redistribution. It yields an important new insight: the extent of minority group political representation among the electoral candidates critically affects redistribution outcomes. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.