Optimal monetary policy and disclosure with an informationally-constrained central banker

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iovino, Luigi; La'O, Jennifer; Mascarenhas, Rui
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.10.008
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 151-172
• 关键词: Monetary policy; Nominal rigidity; Informational frictions; Central bank disclosure; uncertainty

摘要

What is the nature of optimal monetary policy and central bank disclosure when the monetary authority is uncertain about the economic state? We consider a model in which firms make nominal pricing decisions and the central bank sets the nominal interest rate under incomplete information. We find that implementing flexible-price allocations is both feasible and optimal despite the existence of numerous measurability constraints; we explore a series of different implementations. When monetary policy is sub-optimal, public information disclosure by the central bank is welfare-improving as long as either firm or central bank information is sufficiently precise. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.