Minorities' strategic response to discrimination: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kudashvili, Nikoloz; Lergetporer, Philipp
• 署名单位: Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Technical University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104630
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: discrimination; Trust game; experiment; signaling; adolescents

摘要

Discrimination against minorities is pervasive in many societies, but little is known about strategies that minorities apply to minimize discrimination. In our trust game with 758 high-school students in the country of Georgia, ethnic Georgian trustors discriminate against the ethnic Armenian minority group. We introduce an initial signaling stage to investigate Armenians' willingness to hide their ethnicity to avoid expected discrimination. 43 percent of Armenian trustees untruthfully signal that they have a Georgian name. Signaling behavior is driven by expected transfers and identity-based motives. This strategic misrepresentation of ethnicity increases Georgian trustors' expected back transfers and eliminates their discriminatory behavior. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.