Technological change, campaign spending and polarization q

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balart, Pau; Casas, Agustin; Troumpounis, Orestis
• 署名单位: Universitat de les Illes Balears; CUNEF Universidad; Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Padua; Lancaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104666
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: electoral competition; Office motives; Endogenous valence; Campaign spending; Impressionable voters; Semiorder lexicographic preferences

摘要

We present a model of electoral competition with endogenous platforms and campaign spending where the division of voters between impressionable and ideological is also endogenous and depends on parties' strategic platform choices. Our approach results in a tractable model that provides interesting comparative statics on the effect of recent technological advancements. For instance, we can accommodate a new justification behind the well-documented simultaneous increase in campaign spending and polarization: an increase in the effectiveness of electoral advertising, or a decrease in the electorate's political awareness, surely increases polarization and may also increase campaign spending. (c) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).