Firms as tax collectors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garriga, Pablo; Tortarolo, Dario
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105092
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Tax collection; Turnover tax; tax compliance; Withholding

摘要

We show that delegating tax collection duties to large firms can bolster tax capacity in weak -enforcement settings. We exploit two reforms in Argentina that dramatically expanded and subsequently reduced turnover tax withholding by firms. Combining firm -to -firm data with regression discontinuity and difference -in -differences methods centered on revenue eligibility thresholds, we find that: (i) appointing large firms as collection agents (CAs) does not hinder their economic activity, (ii) it leads to a significant increase in self -reported sales and tax payments among CAs' business partners, (iii) these effects are primarily concentrated among downstream firms that lack a traceable paper trail, and (iv) reductions in withholding lead to a decrease in self -reported sales, albeit to a lesser extent. Tax -collecting firms can thus help boost tax compliance and revenue.