Who truly bears (bank) taxes? Evidence from only shifting statutory incidence☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jimenez, Gabriel; Martinez-Miera, David; Peydro, Jose-Luis
• 署名单位: Banco de Espana; Imperial College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105173
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Tax pass-through Tax incidence; banks Inequality Risk-taking Mortgages

摘要

We analyze the effects of only shifting the statutory incidence of taxes by exploiting: (i) a mortgage tax shift from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks, without tax rate changes; (ii) some areas -for historical reasons- being tax-exempt (or having different tax rates); and (iii) administrative data. After the shift, the average mortgage rate increases, less for households with more banking opportunities or with higher income. The tax pass-through is nonexistent for high-income households, but complete for low-income households. Consistently, banks' risk-taking increases, especially by more policy-affected banks. Results are consistent with a model in which all borrowers have tax saliency issues and differ in their bargaining power vis-a`-vis the lender. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the irrelevance of statutory incidence and suggests unintended consequences on inequality and banks' risk-taking.